Blowback against Blowback

I published a post on the tenth anniversary of 9/11 explaining my thoughts on why people became so radicalised that they supported Al Qaeda and even became part of it. I emphasised the importance of cultural dissonance, i.e., feeling apart from a culture. I’m not going to go over the empirical support for my position again – I wanted to give more empirical evidence against a position I dismissed. I did not ignore foreign policy in explanation, but I did say it was neither necessary nor sufficient for terrorism.

The assumption behind thinking foreign policy leads people to lose their morality and start supporting a group that blows people in order to implement regimes that would make whole races and genders second class citizens is that they become aggrieved. This is typically used in the Palestinian context as well: what do you expect the Palestinians to do after their homes have been demolished and their cousins killed? What do you expect the Iraqis to do when the U.S occupies their land?

This assumption is wrong for multiple reasons – it plays on racist assumptions of Arabs as agents moved by external factors. One can point to several societies, including our own, where this faux analysis is not applied – even if there have been comparable or worse atrocities. This post is aimed at addressing that argument so I don’t have to repeat myself. As most of the arguments are about Hamas and Al Qaeda, those are the groups I’ll be addressing.

The Palestinians vs. Hamas

Starting with the Palestinians, this extends not only to IDF attacks but to Israeli policy – like the blockade. Except, there is no empirical proof for it: the blockade was implemented in 2007 – and yet, “according to a variety of polls, support for Hamas has steadily dropped since... its election in January 2006. [P]ublic support for Hamas has not just dropped in the West Bank but in its hometurf of Gaza” (Myths, Illusions and Peace, Ross and Makovsky, p.263).

This result shouldn’t be surprising – it was only after Hamas took over the Gaza strip, carried out a purge of Fatah members and usurped the executive in Gaza that Israel imposed the blockade. Aside from the social and economic woes that followed, this was an illegitimate move: often it is pointed out that Hamas is democratically elected – but this ignores everything that happened the day after the election. Hamas won the legislative elections and then proceeded to take control of the executive functions of government in Gaza – something they were not elected to do. The conflict that broke out between Fatah and Hamas in 2006 led the latter to go after Fatah officials and throwing them off buildings (for a full account of why Hamas took over and initiated a power grab, see here).

Even then, ignoring all of that (which is sufficient to lose all democratic legitimacy), elections have not been held for the legislative or executive body since 2006. Even when the President, who has the right to call them under Palestinian law, calls them, Hamas has consistently opposed them. Israel’s blockade was too restrictive before 2010 and that was wrong – now, the security blockade in place would not be there (as it wasn’t when the PA controlled the area) if there was not a security threat. Palestinians very likely see that – which explains the Palestinians’ continuing opposition to Hamas. Hamas and the other factions have also fired rockets which have led to Israeli response – often in their own areas – which probably explains why 70% of Palestinians want them disarmed.

And this brings us to violence in the Israel-Palestinian conflict – does it really increase radicalisation and lead to more violence? Again, the empirical support is simply not there. Before I get on to the academic literature, I just want to give one example of one set of polling. Operation Cast Lead was carried out from December 2008 to January 2009 – it’s worth looking at polling before and after the attacks to see the support for Hamas. In a December 2008 Near East Consulting poll (before Cast Lead started), support for Hamas was low: Hamas would only have won 10% in the presidential elections, 11% in legislative elections and when asked to respond to the statement, “Some believe that Hamas will win the next election,” a majority obviously disagreed.

In the next Near Consulting Poll in March 2009, the results had not changed much at all: 11% believed Hamas only represented them, they would have received 14% of the vote in presidential elections and they would have won 16% in the legislative elections. Operation Cast Lead seems to have no negligible effect on supporting terrorist organisations. This also explains why Hamas opposes elections: it would get blown out of Palestinian politics.

And this is a consistent finding in the academic literature. In a Journal of Public Economics article, Jaeger et al (2012) investigate “effects of violence on the political preferences of an aggrieved population.” The results are robust and show that “the overall effect of Palestinian fatalities is not statistically significant.” And the same results apply for not just supporting radical groups but their attacks on civilians too. From Haaretz:

According to the poll released by the JMCC [in 2011], since the Gaza war the ratio of Palestinians who opposed "military operations" against Israel rose from 38.1% in January of 2009 to 51.8% in April of 2011 (my emphasis).

Indeed, Palestinians are no more likely to support attacks on civilians than Israelis (in fact, across the Middle East, attacking civilians is a minority position). At the risk of pushing my point again – the same is true for the “killing one of them makes more” argument. Jaeger and Paserman (2008) examine the statistical evidence and conclude “the direction of causality... runs only from violence committed by Palestinians to violence committed by Israelis, and not vice versa.” That is, Israeli casualties lead to Palestinian casualties – but Palestinians casualties do not lead to Israeli casualties. Again, this really shouldn’t be surprising: Israeli counter-terrorism policy through targeted assassination, wide ranging military action is designed to deter and comes in response to terror.

Again, Operation Cast Lead is illustrative of this policy. This came after Hamas first escalated violence in November during the ceasefire and then refused to sign up to another one (see this post for a detailed analysis of the ceasefire). Israel responded – and the result was not more violence:

In fact, post Cast Lead yielded Israel’s “quietest year” in a decade: there was a 90% reduction in the first year and even at its highest levels, rocket fire has not matched even a third of 2007 levels. Something that is even more interesting is how much the circle of violence argument gets it the wrong way around. Hamas, after Cast Lead started patrolling the areas to make sure rockets weren’t fired. They have fired rockets since Operation Cast Lead, but the deterrence – not radicalisation - effect is clear from the graph.

Al Qaeda and its allies

I have covered some of the ground on why foreign policy is not the reason for support for Al Qaeda. Briefly, again, the vast majority of Muslims across the Middle East don’t like Al Qaeda. This gives prima facie evidence to the position I’m advocating: if foreign policy is the cause, why do we not see a wide spread response? To make an analogy: conservatives often argue that pornography leads to violence (in fact, it does the opposite) – but surely, there can be no causal connection by the simple fact that most people can enjoy pornography without grabbing an axe. Even in the West – just think about: a lot of people oppose American foreign policy. They don’t start jumping for AK47s and start supporting Al Qaeda.

And again, the academic support for what I am saying is clear (the support for what is the cause is in the aforementioned 9/11 post). Robert Pape claims to have evidence that occupation leads to suicide terrorism – except his thesis has been thoroughly discredited: the statistics are selective, the thesis inconsistent and stretched to find America at odds. Max Boot has discredited his “study” enough and I would have nothing to add to continue to talk about Pape’s polemics. I would just give one example from Boot of why Pape’s thesis is nonsensical. Over 12,000 people have been killed in Pakistan by Islamist terrorists – and yet there is no occupation. Pape’s answer should have everyone in hysterics: “the alliance between Pakistan and the United States evolved into—what is better termed—an indirect occupation.”

The drone programme also provides another opportunity to put the hypothesis to the test. I have already quoted two studies on how the drone programme has not led to “blowback.” The Washington Post recently claimed that the drone campaign in Yemen is “increasing sympathy for al-Qaeda-linked militants and driving tribesmen to join a network linked to terrorist plots against the United States.” This was based on “20 interviews with tribal leaders, victims’ relatives, human rights activists and officials from four provinces.”

Except, this does not seem to be the end of the matter – Christopher Swift disagrees in an article published in Foreign Affairs. Swift interviewed “40 interviews with tribal leaders, Islamist politicians, Salafist clerics, and other sources.” His conclusions are vastly different from the Washington Post’s:

As a group, they were older, more conservative, and more skeptical of U.S. motives. They were less urban, less wealthy, and substantially less secular. But to my astonishment, none of the individuals I interviewed drew a causal relationship between U.S. drone strikes and al Qaeda recruiting. Indeed, of the 40 men in this cohort, only five believed that U.S. drone strikes were helping al Qaeda more than they were hurting it.

Both studies are limited because they are based on interviews not data on recruitment, attacks and American drone activity. That said, if I had to choose one of these two, I would naturally go with the study with the larger sample. So do I think that “when a U.S. drone missile kills a child in Yemen [or anywhere else mentioned above], the father will go to war with you, guaranteed”? Nope. 

Bad Fences and Bad Neighbours

A Palestinian man sneaking to Israel crosses from Bethlehem, right, into Jerusalem, left, Monday, May 15, 2006. AP

When I started writing this I naively intended to write about three things: the separation barrier, the situation of Gazans and Arab immigration to Palestine. These three things are key talking points of Zionists and I wanted to give a more nuanced and substantive view of them - leaving out the propaganda and coming to a more reasoned view. But, as I started writing about the separation barrier I realised there was no way I could write it all in one post. The separation barrier is claimed by Zionists to be justified because it single-handedly brought the terror down (see for example the Israeli government, Mitchell Bard, the ADL and I assume that the crock Alan Dershowitz makes the argument as well). 

Reduction

The drop in suicide bombing in Israel after the barrier started to be built is hard to deny. When the fence only covered the north of the West Bank, attacks fell from 17 to 5 from 2002-2004. In contrast, in the south of the West Bank where nothing was constructed from 2002-2004, attacks increased from 10 to 11. Hamas in carrying out terrorist attacks began targeting areas available from the south because they were easier to bypass. Amos Harel, Haaretz and one Israel’s leading security analysts made this point in 2004:

Since the completion of the first stage of the separation fence - from Salem to Elkana - in the summer, terror has migrated to the south and east, to areas in which the fence has not yet been built.

And we have evidence straight from the horse’s mouth:

Mousa Abu Marzouq , deputy chairman of Hamas's political bureau in Damascus said that “[carrying out] such attacks is made difficult by the security fence and the gates surrounding West Bank residents ”

Islamic Jihad leader Ramadan Abdallah Shalah said that they had no intention of abandoning suicide bombing attacks but that their timing and the possibility of carrying them out from the West Bank depended on other factors. “For example,” he said, “there is the separation fence which is an obstacle to the resistance and if it were not there, the situation would be entirely different”

Multiple Causes: Undermining the Zionist Narrative 

But, it is ludicrous to state that the barrier is the main reason or the only reason - especially today. Firstly, Palestinian infiltrators into Israel continue to sneak passed the border in their thousands. According to Israel’s Channel 2 news in 2007 there were over 17,000 arrests of illegal workers inside the Green Line in the space of two months. There are various frequent reports of random numbers of Palestinians crossing the line and being sent back (154, 50, 252). It’s inconceivable, given the sheer numbers, that the physical restrictions in crossing the border are enough to account for the decline.

Secondly, its important to note that the barrier is not finished (around two-thirds have been built) – indeed, Israeli police officials consider this to be a “calling out to terrorists.” This also explains why infiltrations are common. Thus, there must be more factors that contribute to the reduction than the incomplete fence which doesn't stop Palestinian workers. Part of the factors are indeed attributable to other Israeli counter-terrorism measures taken:

Rather than producing a tit-for-tat or loop-like confrontation, Israelicounterterrorism – mainly denying the Palestinians a sanctuary area inthe West Bank – has reduced the effects of Palestinian violence considerably.

But equally as important is that the Palestinians themselves have contributed much to the decline of attacks. While the fence played a major role during the Intifada, from 2005, there was an unofficial truce which contributed considerably to the decrease. Shin Bet and the IDF said in 2006 that "main reason for the reduction in terrorist acts over the past year is the truce in the territories" and attribute the reduction to "improvement in their joint capability to foil terrorist attacks and to act against terrorist organizations." And in the aftermath of the battle between Hamas and Fatah, Fatah carried out extensive security operations against Hamas which is probably the biggest reason for the reduction in current violence. So much so that by 2010, Israeli officials were commending PA Security Forces: 

The Palestinian Authority's security forces have shown marked improvement in their action against Hamas and Islamic Jihad recently, according to Israeli security officials... eanwhile, the Palestinian security forces are continuing to apprehend wanted men affiliated with Hamas and Islamic Jihad... [Palestinian] sources said the PA had confiscated tons of explosives and numerous firearms in recent months and that arrests of Hamas and Islamic Jihad operatives were ongoing.

Multiple consequences 

Undeniably, the route of the fence has meant land confiscations; estimates of land inside the barrier and the Green Line range from 7% to 9.5%. B'Tselem documents how the barrier has ulterior moves including the expansion of existing Israeli settlements and often these motives took over:

...security-related reasons [were] of secondary importance in certain locations, in cases when they conflicted with settlement expansion, the planners opted for expansion, even at the expense of compromised security.

The barrier has also had negative effects on freedom of movement, access to agricultural land and the indirect effects to employment and healthcare. The Israeli Supreme Court even says that it goes beyond these issues, "The injury is of far wider a scope. It strikes across the fabric of life of the entire population." The result of the better security position was actually an easing of the internal security aparatus in the West Bank: in 2010, there were only 14 checkpoints in the West Bank (vs. 528 in 2006) but all the aforementioned negatives are unlikely to be outweighed. 

Overall, the barrier has contributed to the reduction of terror attacks against Israelis. Its significance has declined since the reduction of the threat (which came about mainly through Israeli counter-terror operations and joint PA-Israel cooperation). It has had several negative effects. The solution should be improving the faults not removing the barrier itself. The constant appeals to the Supreme Court should be used to re-route the barrier which helps avoid many of these issues. The courts reasoning on the barrier should be implemented effectively:

We accept that the military commander cannot order the construction of the separation fence if his reasons are political. The separation fence cannot be motivated by a desire to "annex" territories to the State of Israel.. Indeed, the military commander of territory held in belligerent occupation must balance between the needs of the army on one hand, and the needs of the local inhabitants on the other.

And just two final points: it is not a “Wall,” and trying to label it as such is ignorant given that over 90% of it is a fence. Secondly, just a word on the rationale that is being defended: the role of the barrier is not to protect Israel, it is to protect Israelis. And to that end, the barrier should protect civilians who are in the illegal settlements in the West Bank. Indeed, there was a greater casualty drop between 2002 and 2004 for Israeli settlers than there were for Israelis within the Green Line (90% vs. 75%). Their illegal presence does not mean they should be left to the slaughter. Nor should it mean that their position is made sacrosanct by the route of the barrier - as the Supreme Court says it cannot be used to annex land. 

The University of Life

Earlier in the year I attended an event at the London School of Economics about the academic boycott of Israeli academic institutions. The recording of the event is available on the LSE website here. The speaker who spoke for the academic boycott of Israel made various arguments. What emerged were a series of absurd arguments that could equally be applied to British universities. 

This attack is not to give legitimacy to any of the views of those who hold them, rather it is an internal deconstruction of their normative and moral consistency. I acknowledge that this will not deal with the issues of practicalities but only of principle. I will be referencing the Armed Force and the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.  (My own opinion is in most cases the direct polar opposite: I support our Armed Forces and the direct material support our universities give to them in their operations in the Middle East.) The aim is to show that, unless these individuals advocate a boycott in principle, that there is a moral inconsistency in its application to Israel. Of course, the following argument applies only to those who have moral issues with the British military activities in Afghanistan, Iraq and wherever else. 

The argument presented was that universities give "ideologically and material support" to Israel's actions in the West Bank and Gaza, its military superiority which is used to oppress and kill Palestinians. Several examples of this were given through military research and development. The case study used was Tel Aviv University; geophysicists refine tunnel detection, computer scientists design robots, organic chemist help identify suspect, Zoologists train dogs for military use, mechanical engineers help improve aircraft etc. What Dr Chalcraft fails to note is that many of these things are present in British universities. 

Material Support

A study carried out by 'Study War No More' found that (.pdf)

Our research found that between 2001 and 2006, more than 1,900 military projects were conducted in the 26 UK universities covered by this report. In terms of income to these universities, we have estimated the total value of these projects to be a minimum of £725 million

As a counter case study to the Tel Aviv University, there is the University of Bristol: Bristol's Division of Farm Animal Science has recieved over £300,000 from the Defence Science & Technology Laboratory which works to "develop battle-winning technologies, based on deep and widespread research, supporting UK military operations now and in the future." Just as Tel Aviv University train and work with dogs for a military purpose, so does Bristol University. This is not to mention the inevitable funding for military research in engineering and communications which there is a "strong probability" of being used in combat missions.

Abi Haque of the Campaign Against Arms Trade has "no doubts" that the military funding has been used in Iraq and Afghanistan. And this funding is not just confined to the British military research by the Ministry of Defence; a large source of funding is the United States Army. Cambridge received over £250,000 from the United States Government. 

There are various academic institutions who work alongside the Atomic Weapons Establishment (the body responsible for the design and mafacturing of the UK's nuclear deterrent). Professor Stephen Jarvis of the University of Warwick has had four research projects with the AWE. Dr Venky Dubey of Bournemouth University recently took part in the "development of a multi-fingered robotic hand" for the AWE. 

And this does seem to be limited to material support for military, according to the report there are 'strong levels of influence of science, engineering and technology departments.' The report also asked 40 academics how they felt about the military funding, the conclusion was

Broadly speaking, the replies received present a liberal view ofthe university-military relationship. For example, when itcomes to the ethics of military research, many of theinterviewees emphasise the ‘personal conscience’ of theindividual scientist

Indeed, according to Dr. Chris Langley, university departments are pushing for the highly militaristic system:

Case studies of US and UK science and engineering programmes are used to describe the recent military-university partnerships which, it is contended, drive a high technology, weapons-dominated system... 

Hiring and Honouring

Chalcroft then goes on to discuss various other aspects which he says he doesn't have time to go into but merely lists them. Included in this are the fact that those who believe its okay to kill civilians and are part of the Zionist enterpreise are honoured and hired by Israeli institutions. Again, this is far from unique. These are just a few examples of the previous four professional heads of the British Army from 1997 to 2009. 

General Sir Roger Wheeler – Chief of the General Staff, head of the British Army 1997-2000: Honorary Fellow of Hertford College, University of Oxford

General Sir Michael Walker – Chief of the General Staff, head of the British Army 2000-2003: Honorary Graduate of Cranfield University.

General Sir Mike Jackson – Chief of the General Staff, head of the British Army 2003-2006 and had responsibility for force generation for Afghanistan and Iraq: Honorary Graduate from the University of Sheffield.

General Sir Richard Dannatt – Chief of the General Staff, head of the British Army 2006-2009, Commander-in-Chief, Land Command 2005-2006 and before which he was the Commander of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (which planned for the military deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan): Honorary Doctorate in Civil Law from the Universities of Durham and Kent and in Technology from Anglia Ruskin University and Honorary Fellow of Hatfield College, Durham.

And if we’re going outside of the British military and just giving space to those who think its ‘okay to kill civilians’ then one need no go farther than the whole host of extremist speakers that have given talks across British universities including the current head of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Anwar Awalaki.  Indeed, just as one further example, Grote Professor Emeritus of the Philosophy of Mind and Logic at University College London, Ted, Honderich, has ludicrously written that 

‘Palestinians have a moral right to their terrorism within historic Palestine against neo-Zionism… Terrorism, as in this case, can as exactly be self-defence, a freedom struggle, martyrdom, the conclusion of an argument based on true humanity, etc.’

Other University Programmes 

A further aspect Chalcroft lists is the 'extensive institutionalised links, special privileges in the form of accelerated degree programmes, training programme for military personnel.' It should be obvious by now that this man either has complete ignorance of Western universities or is oblivious to them. Study War No More notes that military funding goes toward

student and staff sponsorship (e.g.studentships, chairs, bursaries, prizes, scholarships, fees andgrants), industrial placements, conferences, benefactions,consultancies, careers and graduate fairs, travel grants andteaching programmes

For a specific example, King's College London has a department called the Defence Studies Department which is

an integral part of the UK Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC), which provides command and staff training at single-service, advanced and higher levels for the three Armed Services of the United Kingdom to a world class standard.. DSD staff also provide expert advice and academic leadership on study-tours to battlefields, and wider policy advice to the Ministry of Defence as part of the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom.

King's College London has "responsibility for academic support to military command and staff training." And this is not a rare occurence, Edinburgh University recieves money from the Ministry of Defence to pay for degrees. There are "collaborative research grants at UK universities with the EPSRC to the tune of £5 million per annum" collaborating on 153 research projects.

So it appears the British universities help advance military technology, provide programmes for security personnel and honour those who have helped lead the Armed Forces. This is not something to be shamed, this is something to be proud of. The major nexus between Israel and the UK is whether the military is doing something which should be encouraged - it has been accepted that the issue of moral consistency relies on whether someone takes a view that the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq are wrong. Of course, it is likely that someone may think British universities are not worthy of shunning because they support those wars. But, the key thing is that there are those who support Israel's action in the same way - and the way to change either of these views is through engagement. 

Benny Hill vs. Benny Morris

The London School of Economics hosted Benny Morris on a talk about the 1948 war on Tuesday night. The lecture Morris gave didn't contain anything new that he hasn't already written down. Yet, the people in the audience seemed to confuse giving a lecture with an actual book with footnotes. And it now appears, people present just don't seem to be listening. In a blogpost about the event on 'London BDS,' they make several claims about what Benny Morris said - a lot of which is just untrue. For those who wish to fact-check, the full lecture is now available on LSE's youtube page; 

London BDS states:

Morris claims that the war of 1948 was not only about land and national rights, but ‘the Arab’ side was also driven by an Islamic Jihad. He cited a few sources for this conclusion – it was not clear how authoritative or genuine the sources are, but that does not matter to Morris. 

Nope. Morris said that some elements in the Arab side thought of the 1948 war as a Holy War. In saying so, he cited three examples: declarations from Al-Zahr University, the Muslim Brotherhood and members of the Arab Higher Committe. In essence what Morris is saying is that there were some elements which thought of it as a Holy War; and he was honest about not overstating this -- more than once: 

"I've scratched the surface.. I've thrown it out. It something that exists there and is a reality but how deep a reality, how wide a reality has to be more thoroughly investigated.. What I'm saying is that you'll find what they [Al Zahr Univerity] what they passed on the 2nd of December elsewhere in the Arab world as well including among the leadership. Its true we are not talking about democracies.. so you don't really know what the masses were thinking but to the extent what one knows what was going in the higher echelons many people took what was happening in 47-47 as a Holy War"

"From the Arab side, it was seen as a jihad by some leaders and some of the people.. It is something which has to be investigated.. to fully comprehend how deep was it"

 London BDS:

Extraordinary though, is his view about the Zionist movement at the time; Morris said later in an answer to a question from the audience that Zionists in the 1948 war were almost atheists and not mainly motivated by religion.

Morris was faced with several questions about the religious dimension of the Jewish side in the '48 war, with one audience member suggesting that there was some kind of 'Jewish Jihad.' In this context, he is absolutely right to say that this is "nonsense." The Zionist movement was a nationalist, predominantly secular, socialist movement. Morris was right when he said that "[they] had thoroughly rejected God.. one finds nothing basically, of a Jihadi element in the Jewish side; it was a secular movement driven by secular concerns..."

London BDS:

Morris then went on to speculate that in 1948 Arabs had genocidal intentions towards the Jews. No evidence was provided by Morris to support his speculation.

Nope. He was very clear that there was no evidence and speculation was dismissed:

On the Arab side... the Jews interpreted what the Palestinians Arabs were doing as an effort to destroy their community and perhaps genocidally to destroy them... But this is not documented, and is not well documented at all in terms of the Arab leadership in Palestine. They very rarely used genocidal terms, I've gone through the material.. They don't talk genocidally, they do talk politicidally.. [On Arab states] were their states genocidal? We don't know that either because there were no genocidal or verifiable genocidal statements... Nobody said that."

London BDS:

Morris claims there was no official policy to force out Arabs in 1948. He thinks the hundreds of thousands of Arabs refugees just happened – through fear. He does not mention or discuss at any time evidence from other historians that the forced expulsion of Palestinians in 1947 and 1948 was part of a calculated plan.

Because there was no official policy; there were intentional expulsions, expulsion orders but no official uniform policies. Its obvious to tell that the person writing this is not paying attention to the nuance of Morris' record on the Palestinian refugee problem. There were several factors; and this 'fear' caused by the war itself, the Jewish attacks on neighbouring villages, the direct, intentional expulsions. True, propagandists like Ilan Pappe claim there was a policy but this is just simply not true. Plan D was never implemented as a formal leadership decision (and why Arabs remain in Israel). 

Moderate Extremists

There has been some recent coverage about the tiff in Hamas between Zahar and Meshall. The Economists reports that:

ALL is not well in the camp of Hamas, the Palestinians’ Islamist faction that rules the Gaza Strip. No sooner had its leader in exile, Khaled Meshal, declared his readiness for Mahmoud Abbas, who heads the Palestinians’ more moderate Fatah faction, to relaunch negotiations with Israel, than one of Hamas’s leaders in Gaza, Mahmoud Zahar, said Mr Abbas did not speak for the Palestinians: “Our programme is against negotiations in this way because they are a waste of time.”

It seems that Meshal forgot to send the memo around (for comprehensive overview see here, and see recent statements here, here and here). Whats more interesting is the reported motivations for Zahar's outburst. It's not a well kept secret that Hamas has to compete to make sure that its radical base does not leave. The Salafi-movement in Gaza is gaining men from Hamas who they see as abandoning their principles. Some estimates cited by the International Crisis Group, up to 60% of Salafis are former Hamas men. Thus, its not surprising that those closest to the base (including Zahar) maintain the absolutist line. (This is of course to imply that Meshal is a moderate, the movement is fundamentally a rejectionist position). 

However, there may actually be personal reasons for the recent backlash according to Palestinian sources. According to Firas Press, Hamas sources say the dispute is "due to the dispute is about the size of the representation of parties in political office."  Firas Press  also reports that the rift was caused by "reckless and personal reasons." 

The [Hamas] source explained that the President of the Political Bureau of Hamas [Meshal] rejected a few months ago to adopt a motion to print and publish a book entitled "Universal Truth of Civilizations" [written by al Zahar]. Meshaal had totally rejected that the movement financially ensured the process of publishing."

Incidentally, this is the same anti-semitic book which argues that there is no place for Jews in any civilisation. In a speech about the books, al-Zahar says that  because they "are no less strong or honorable as the peoples who expelled and uprooted them," they will also expel the Jews from Palestine. In his book he also states that 

Even if the independent Jewish entity ceases to exist, the state of special, constant animosity will not end, since the nations of eastern and western Europe as well as Arab countries lived in that kind of relationship with the Jews for many centuries prior to the establishment of the Jewish state in Palestine. 

One thing dispute does not show is any moderation in Hamas. Hamas has rejected to recognise Israel, its officials have continued to call for the complete liberation. One thing it does show however is the problem with "relative moderation." Compare Zahar - the guy who thinks Jews have no place in civilisations - to Meshal (helpfully forgetting his previous statements on suicide bombing and Israel) and what do you get? "Moderate" Hamas officials.