The Missing Martyrs: Why there
are so few Muslim Terrorists by Charles Kurzman (Oxford University Press,
2011), pp.256
I recently finished re-reading The End of History by Francis Fukuyama
and I still accept his core argument: history is directional. The
contradictions inherent in illiberal regimes, economic systems and ideology
inevitably lead to liberal democracy. Fukuyama doesn’t spend much time
discussing Islam and Islamism as a possible challenge to liberal democracy
because, as he notes, the ‘religion has virtually no appeal outside those areas
that were culturally Islamic to begin with.’ He goes on to say
Indeed, the
Islamic world would seem more vulnerable to liberal ideas in the long run than
the reverse, since such liberalism has attracted numerous and powerful Muslim
adherents over the past century and a half (p.46).
Later in the book he says that
But now [i.e.,
in 1991], outside the Islamic world,
there appears to be a general consensus that accepts liberal democracy's claims
to be the most rational form of government (p.211)
Charles Kurzman’s The Missing Martyrs goes some way into
explaining that Fukuyama’s first quoted statement is largely correct and the
second statement is, at the very least, too simplistic when it comes to the
Middle East in 2013. The rest of this post is a review of three elements of the
book I found interesting – one of which speaks to the Fukuyama extracts.
Terrorism: Kurzman’s Mea Culpa
Firstly, his main thesis is that
there are an incredibly small amount of Islamist terrorists relative to the
number of Muslims. Moreover, there are a small number of supporters of such
terrorists. Kurzman has several data points for these two propositions: he
starts with quoting upset Al Qaeda statements:
We are most
amazed that the community of Islam is still asleep and heedless while its
children are being wiped and killed everywhere and its land being diminished
every day... Oh, brother in religion, why have quit supporting Islam an its
people (p.8-9) - Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
In fact, Al Qaeda planned to
carry attacks on the West Coast of the U.S during 9/11 but they ‘could not find
qualified people to carry it out’ (p.12). Of course, the most persuasive
evidence is simply the numbers: ‘Islamist terrorists have managed to recruit
fewer than 1 in 15,000 Muslims over the past quarter century and fewer than 1
in 100,000 Muslims since 9/11’ (p.11). The two people who have read all my
posts know that all of the above is music to my ears because it’s something
I’ve been saying for a really long time. True, many others have said it but
almost no one accepts the
implication of such a view:
...the vast
majority of Muslims across the Middle East don’t like Al Qaeda. This gives
prima facie evidence to the position I’m advocating: if foreign policy is the
cause, why do we not see a wide spread response?[1]
I haven’t seen anyone make or
accept this argument – until now, and it comes in the form of a mea culpa.
Kurzman, back in 2001, was part of the ‘blowback’ brigade. He argued against
military action would lead to increased attacks. As it turned out
Johnson [the
author of Blowback] was wrong, and so
was I. Afghans did not sign up with Al Qaeda... and Muslims around the world
did not [violently] protest against the invasion... the overall level of
Islamist terrorism remained stable... Islamist groups carried out 60 attacks
per moth prior to 9/11 and 43 per month in the following year. Non-Islamist
groups carried out a similar number of attacks during the same period (p.143)
The Iraq War produces the same
result: there were ‘an average of 47 attack per month in year before the
invasion and 44 per month afterward’ (p.144). It was only in 2007 where there
was a large jump. Kurzman doesn't go into the reasons for this – but its clear
from the data that I’ve previously shown this has very little to do with
Western foreign policy. That said, Kurzman is incorrect because he goes too
far: he says that terrorism is inelastic (i.e., Western foreign policy is
irrelevant). This is far more acceptable than the Greenwaldian blowback
nonsense but it is just simply a fact that our military action has reduced
violence (see here, here and here).
There are some data points which
contradict this argument about the Muslim world shunning terrorists:
[In 2003], in
nine Muslim-majority countries, disturbingly large percentages expressed
confidence in Bin Ladin [sic] “to do the right thing regarding world
affairs”... 55% of Indonesians and Jordanians, 62% of Pakistanis, 77% of
Palestinians (p.29)[2]
Greenwald would happily explain
that these levels of support are genuine and tell us about foreign policy. The
reality is that these results are not genuine expressions of support for Al
Qaeda. Kurzman believes that these responses are given as part of rebellious
fad of anti-Americanism which he calls ‘radical sheikh’ (a play on Tom Wolfe’s
‘radical chic’ - a similarly rebellious fad of American hipsters expressing
support for communist revolution). I’m unconvinced by this because polling
shows that only a third state that they sympathise with Al Qaeda’s goal to
‘confront the U.S’ (out of those who have any sympathy with it (p.48)).
A far more persuasive explanation
which Kurzman never explicitly states is the proliferation of the conspiracy
that Al Qaeda was not behind 9/11 (although he comes close on p.48-9). According
to Pew,
there is ‘no Muslim public in which even 30% accept that Arabs conducted the
attacks.’ So when they express support in Bin Laden, the vast majority cannot
be expressing support in attacks like 9/11. Which is why (as will be outlined
below), you find overwhelmingly large majorities in favour of democracy and similar
levels of support for civilian attacks as Westerners.
The reason I find this
explanation so much more persuasive is because it matches the path of the question
that is asked. If you look at the Pew
results you will see confidence in Bin Laden going down year on year:
Over time,
support for bin Laden has dropped sharply among Muslim publics. Since 2003, the
percentage of Muslims voicing confidence in him has declined by 38 points in
the Palestinian territories and 33 points in Indonesia. The greatest decline
has occurred in Jordan, where 56% of Muslims had confidence in bin Laden in
2003, compared with just 13% in the current poll.
The reasons why it has gone down
so radically could be because people started to realise that Al Qaeda meant
support for violence – more research is needed into this question. But one
thing does remain clear: there is no way to reconcile (i) the decline in
support for the ‘confidence in Bin Laden’ proposition and (ii) huge support for
regimes which AQ would call apostate governments with any expressed support for
Bin Laden – unless you see it as not supporting Bin Laden at all.
Ideology and the End of History
Kurzman shows how the second
Fukuyama statement quoted above is overstated:
The World
Values Survey and a variety of subsequent polls have asked respondents whether
they agreed or disagreed with the statement, “Democracy may have problems, but
its better than any other form of government.” More than three-quarters of
Muslims agreed... this included 71% of Saudi citizens, 83% of Palestinians and
85% of Afghans (p.110).
This is should be the first
riposte to those who claim that we cannot ‘impose democracy’: it is not an
imposition, it is giving the people what they want. In any event, I don’t think
it makes any sense to talk of “imposing” choice, its a self-refuting proposition[3].
Kurzman’s claims about how liberal Middle
Eastern Muslims are a little harder to accept. He defines ‘liberal Islam’ as
the acceptance of ‘key ideals of Western liberal tradition such as democracy,
human rights, social equality, tolerance’ (p.95). This is a good definition but
he goes to say that these ‘ideals
[are approached] from a distinctly Islamic discourse.’
The reason its hard to accept the
liberalism of M.E Muslims should be apparent from this result: Gallup found
‘majorities or near majorities in dozens of Muslim societies favouring the
implementation of Sharia’ (p.109). The extent to which this is a negative
result, of course, depends on the content of ‘Sharia.’ Kurzman believes that Middle
East Muslims reconcile their ‘dual ideals of sharia and democracy’ through ‘a
combination of political liberalism and cultural conservatism’ (p.117). Kurzman
attempts to show this in two ways: first, in
practice, people do not choose Islamist governments and secondly, support
for Sharia may simply be a ‘symbolic gesture.’
This latter second claim is
supported by the following finding: ‘majorities in 13 out of 14 Muslim
[countries] agreed’ with the statement that ‘religion is a matter of personal
faith and should be kept separate from government policy’ (p.110). However,
unlike the Bin Laden result, we have reasons for thinking this is not merely
symbolic but translates to actual support for Islamist policies. The latest Pew
data finds that 40% or more of most Middle East countries want Sharia
applied to non-Muslims; there are majorities in support of barbaric penalties
like amputations; there is anywhere between 44% and 84% support for stoning for
adultery (of those who want Sharia to be the law – which also constitutes a
majority); between 29% and 86% support for the death penalty for apostasy. This
is not liberalism ‘approached through a distinctly Islamic discourse’ – this is
a clear manifestation of illiberalism.
It’s not all bad, of course, most
Muslims ‘also embrace specific features of a democratic system, such as
competitive elections and free speech.’
Moreover, a majority Muslims in the Middle East do support ‘equal
education for boys and girls [and] women having the right to decide whether to
wear the veil’ and state that ‘women should be allowed to vote, hold cabinet
level positions and work outside the home’ (p.116). But again, it is a stretch
to state that the ‘conservatism’ of Middle East Muslims does not ‘translate
into illiberal policies’ (p.116).
Taking Kurzman’s first claim
about Islamists losing elections: historically, it does seem to be correct
(bearing in mind this book was published in 2011):
in more than
80 election in Muslims societies over the past generation, Islamic parties do
worse in the freest election than the non-freest. Overall, most Islamic parties
won less than 15% of seats, and only once has an Islamic party won an outright
majority.
This should show that the idea
that Arabs or Muslims are hostile to democracy/non-Islamist parties is utter
nonsense. However the
trend has not been followed since 2011. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood
and Nour parties won 70% of all seats; in Tunisia a relatively liberal Islamist
party won 41% of the vote and in Libya another relatively liberal Islamist part
won 48.8% of the vote. I am not suggesting that all Islamist parties are the
same but they are certainly not the kind of human rights-respecting parties
that would garner seats in this country.
There are many non-ideological
explanations for this: civil society in these countries has not been allowed to
flourish whereas religious groups have giving them an organisational headstart.
Polls carried out between August 2011 and June 2012 showed between 51% and 56%
preferred a democratic-civil state rather than an Islamic state – but this
didn’t align with the results of the election. But organisationally: Islamist
parties have four times as many active members and more than double the amount
of campaign volunteers (source).
But it would be wrong, given the
results shown above about support of illiberal policies, to suggest this is
entirely about non-ideological factors. Over time, however, this will change –
we are seeing the pangs of refusing to have liberal democracy subverted in
Egypt. Where Islamist come into power, they will fail (a July 2013 poll
found that 73% thought that Morsi didn’t make a ‘single good decision’; 82% support
the military’s ousting of Morsi)[4]. It is also encouraging that less Islamist
parties have won in Tunisia and Libya[5].
To summarise: From the survey of
the polling, it does appear that the Muslim world has accepted democracy. But
it is a stretch to say that there is an acceptance of political liberalism.
There are encouraging levels of support for selective forms of free
speech, limited personal freedoms and pluralism
– but the thing about liberalism is that it cannot be selective. The barbarity
of punishments, gender discrimination and religious involvement speaks to the
conflict of political liberalism and Sharia rather than reconciliation between
the two.
This is not to suggest that the
Muslim world will not change – I think it will, particularly as civil society
(on which, see below) and free speech grows. History is directional and the
contradictions in a non-liberal democracy will manifest themselves – this is
just a fact that is inherent in the superiority of liberal democracy. There are
problems in overstating the liberalism (as Kurzman does) and illiberalism (as
many on the right do) in Muslim countries but one fact
should encourage us all: Arab spring ‘crowds were much larger than the ones
that have formed in the past few days [protesting the anti-Islam film in 2012].’
Democratisation
This section has nothing to do
with the book but its interesting to ask why Middle Eastern countries haven’t
democratised despite having populations which explicitly endorse democracy. I
am not talking here about the causes of revolution – I have stated my opinion
on that before: the socio-economic, cultural explanations of revolution (and
crime and terrorism) almost always fail. In fact, Brownlee,
Masoud and Reynolds (2013) find in their statistical study that ‘there were
no structural preconditions for the emergence
of [the Arab] uprisings.’ I am instead asking: why, given that the people
endorse democracy, have they not had their way? The answer
is a mixture of brute force (which oil-states can fund), hereditary monarchies
(who have a lot of loyalty) and, most importantly, an anti-democratic institutional
framework.
There are two studies which show
exactly how the institutional framework severely impedes successful democracy
despite the wishes of its people. Kuran
(2013) builds on his work on Islamic economic institutions (reviewed on
this blog here)
and shows how Islamic institutions (not people or culture) have inhibited the
rise of a civil society. The most significant of these is the waqf – this is an institution which
provides public services (like schools and water). This was a form of trust
which was funded by a private individual’s assets. It allowed the individual to
protect their assets without giving it to the government.
As Kuran states, ‘the waqf served
as the delivery vehicle for functions met in the West generally through
corporations’ (p.400). The reason the waqf
matters is because a waqf could not participate in politics, could not
align with other waqfs and was not accountable to its users. Compare this with
a corporation which can take part in politics and was accountable to its
customers and its stakeholders. And the absence of the corporation matters:
Democratic rights
got established because of epic struggles driven by groups organized, usually
as corporations, within universities, as cities, as religious orders, as
unions, or as merchant associations. Such groups demanded rights. They
articulated requests. They developed blueprints for alternative orders. They
stimulated intellectual life. (p.401)
Hence this absence of the
corporation as an institution left ‘the Islamic world without politically
influential social structures situated between the individual and the state’ (p.402).
Chaney
(2012) provides another institution which impeded the growth of civil
society: the use of slave armies in Islamic conquests. The use of ‘these slave
armies allowed rulers to achieve independence from local military and civilian
groups’ (p.12). The only check that formed on this ruler (backed by his slave
armies) was religious associations but both these groups ‘worked to resist the
emergence of rival centers of political power such as merchant guilds that
could have facilitated institutional change’ (p.12).[6]
The use of slave armies explains different
results in different countries which were invaded by Muslim armies: slave
armies were not used in India and the Balkans and hence a dual effect that (i)
the ruler would have to cooperate with the existing groups with the effect that
(ii) wholesale institutional importation could not be carried out. Both of
these allow for strong civil society to arise. (Chaney’s paper is excellent
because he provides statistical support his argument against other explanations
of democratic deficit).
These historical Islamic
institutions explain why civil society is so weak – even today. This does not
mean that widespread protests cannot occur – it simply means that the citizenry
are organisationally weak. It means that even when you have support for
democracy across the population, institutional reform is difficult. It is with
this institutional framework in mind that one should read Sheri Berman’s
article in Foreign
Affairs:
The
fundamental mistake most commentators on the Arab Spring make is
underestimating the scale, scope, and perniciousness of authoritarianism.
Tyranny is more than a type of political order; it is an economic and social
system as well, one that permeates most aspects of a country’s life and has
deep roots in a vast array of formal and informal institutions. Achieving
liberal democracy is thus not simply a matter of changing some lines on a
political wiring diagram but, rather, of eliminating authoritarian legacies...
One of the best ways to help
foster civil society is help create these groups. According to the New
York Times, this is exactly what the U.S did in the run up to the Arab
Spring. As they note, ‘the United States’ democracy-building campaigns played a
bigger role in fomenting protests than was previously known, with key leaders
of the movements having been trained by the Americans in campaigning,
organizing through new media tools and monitoring elections.’
Shortfalls
Aside from the shortfall
mentioned above, there are several other shortfalls. Firstly, a general theme
of Kurzman’s book: he seeks to underplay the good that Western military action
can do. In explaining the low levels of Islamist terrorists, part of his
explanation involves Muslim pushback and ‘symbolic support’ (which is explained
above). That is undoubtedly true: but this small group of terrorists can be
eliminated. In fact, even he notes that since the liberation of Afghanistan
‘the scale of terrorist training has dropped by 90 percent’ (p.12). The same
has happened in Pakistan where Al Qaeda has been decimated[7] – and the whole host
of other
examples I’ve given in the past.
As I’ve shown above, Kurzman has
a tendency to overstate the liberalism of Middle East Muslims. Rather more
surprisingly, he has a tendency to overstate that extent to which terrorist
organisations are willing to change their behaviour. He does this generally:
Most of these
[terrorist] organisations abandoned revolutionary violence a generation ago and
now run candidates in parliamentary elections, with platforms that pledge
allegiance to democracy and limit jihad to peaceful definition (aside from
destroying Israel) (p.42-3).
I laughed at the end of that
sentence – I particularly liked that he put it in brackets. He also does the
same thing more specifically to Hamas and the Taliban. He points to the fact
that Hamas leaders signed a statement which ‘condemn[ed] in the strongest terms
the incidents [i.e., 9/11] which are against all human and Islamic norms’
(p.43). I didn’t know about this but I think its (i) selective because Hamas praised
Bin Laden (and the chances of this being symbolic are slim because it happened
in 2011) and (ii) irrelevant because it carries out terror attacks. True Hamas
endorses nationalism whereas Al Qaeda is globalist but that is about it.
On the Taliban, I find Kurzman
more egregious. Kurzman claims that ‘the Taliban leadership remained dubious [first]
of al-Qaida’s global aspirations and [secondly of] killing of civilians’
(p.79). His evidence that the Taliban doesn’t like to kill civilians? Mullah
Omar’s orders which says that they should not ‘cause death and injury to
innocent people.’ Lets ignore that we shouldn’t take a terrorist organisation’s
word especially when they have a history in massacring innocents – the order is
meant for public consumption. If you look at orders Mullah Omar gives in
private, you’ll see he approves of the massacre of innocents. Article 10 of a 2009
order allows Taliban terrorists to kill hostages who are not just soldiers
but “government workers” but even this says that care should be taken not to
harm “local people” (Article 41). But then came a 2010
Order which was not intended for public consumption and it stated
2. Capture and
kill any Afghan who is supporting and/or working for coalition forces or the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.
3. Capture and
kill any Afghan women who are helping or providing information to coalition
forces
These people are civilians – even
the “informers” are civilians who are merely helping their democratic
government. Note that it allows for the killing of anyone who ‘supports’ the
government – a government that was democratically elected that polls show have an extraordinary amount of support. Both claims
about the Taliban are shown to be incorrect by the
fact that Taliban had a camp to train suicide bombers to be dispatched to
the West. The cooperation between the Taliban and Al Qaeda is such that a
Taliban spokesperson stated
that
They [al
Qaeda] are among the first groups and banners that pledged allegiance to the
Emir of the Believers [Mullah Omar, the leader of the Afghan Taliban], and they operate in Afghanistan under the flag
of the Islamic Emirate
The Taliban have refused to
denounce Al Qaeda – and so to say they don’t have global aspirations is
misleading (see here,
here,
here,
here).
They will allow the Taliban to operate and help them in their global endeavours
to attack the West. The Taliban’s primary goal is to remove the democratically
elected government of Afghanistan and the coalition forces but given their
material support for Al Qaeda that really shouldn’t matter.
Finally, a shortfall is his view
that ‘Muslim liberals suffer the second hand smoke of American foreign policy’
(p.156) because association with America leads to them being targeted. He
therefore praises the Obama administration’s ‘restraint’ and ‘hands off
approach’ during the 2009 Iranian elections (p.158-9). I’ve always thought this
view of what Obama did has been somewhat overstated (see this fact
check of Romney’s claim that Obama was ‘silent’) but in any event assuming
he was muted, his silence was regretted not just by Iranian reformists (which
he admits on p.159) but also the Obama administration itself (see this New
York Times report). Either Obama spoke out in which case its a bad
example or he didn’t speak out and it turned out to be wrong choice because
everyone regretted it. And even then, regardless
of which one is right, the Iranians condemned
the U.S anyway (i.e., it led to the result that Kurzman wanted to avoid). More
generally I think his approach is wrong because of the New York Times report quoted above about the U.S having an
important role in civil society organisations and the Arab spring.
Despite the negatives I’ve
listed, this really is a good book. I don’t think there’s been a more
interesting book on terrorism in a very long time. I have a couple of other
gripes but this post is already long enough. Merry Christmas!
